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TESTPIONY
OF
TIlE I10NORABLE EDl.vARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TIlE UNITED STATES

BEFORE

THE SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

9:30 A.M.
UNITED STATES SENATE
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1976
WASHINGTON, D.C.

46J.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate your invitation to discuss with you today
congressional oversight of intelligence operations.
recognize the seriousness of the subject.

We all

Substantive

foreign policy determinations and establishment of defenses
adequate for our nation's security are among the most essential
demands upon our government.

Errors in such decisions carry

the potential for immediate and severe consequences both
for ourselves and for our friends abroad.

The wisdom of these

decisions cannot be guaranteed; we can rely only upon the
informed judgment of those charged with making and those
charged with carrying out our policy.

How our intelligence

apparatus is constructed, then, is literally a vital question.
In addition, it must be of particular concern that any system
of surveillance be conducted with a scrupulous regard for
citizens' rights of speech and privacy.

The Congress and

the President share the responsibility of assuring that the
intelligence system employed by this government at once provides the information necessary to both policy formation and
implementation and protects the constitutional rights of the
citizenry.

\

Among the subjects which I would like to discuss with the
Committee are these:

First, what are the constitutional and

institutional constraints on Congress' role in this area;

I·
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second, how, in providing for performance of Congress'
legitimate role, can the confidentiality of information
essential to intelligence operations best be maintained.

As

to this latter point, one may distinguish between the
authority of the Congress to obtain information for a
particular committee or committees, or for the Congress
more generally; the authority of the Committee or Congress
to publish such information; the state of the law as to the
power of members of Congress or their staffs under the
speech and debate clause to divulge such information, and
the persistent problem, whenever there are matters of high
secrecy, of completely unauthorized, intended or unintended,
disclosures.

I would like then to proceed to the

topic which concerns the role of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as essentially a law enforcement agency, and
the difficulties which have to be faced if one seeks to view
its intelligence functions as separate for oversight purposes
While responsibility is shared for ultimate success in
constructing viable intelligence procedures and formulating
intelligence policy, the mode of discharge of this iesponsibility by the Executive and Legislative Branches must differ.
Congress may by statute set policy in those areas granted for
its consideration by the Constitution and may determine
acceptable procedures for officers and agents of the federal
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government.
function.

It may gather information necessary to this
Daily implementation of policy and interstitial

policy formation, particularly in foreign affairs, is an
Executive function.

This Separation of Powers is, of course,

basic to our government.

As stated by the Supreme Court

one week ago in Buckley v. Va1eo, Slip. op. at 113-114:
. all litigants and all of the courts which
have addressed themselves to the matter start
on common ground in the recognition of the
intent of the Framer!3' that the powers of the
three great branches of the National Government
be largely separate from one another.
The limits upon the powers of the respective Branches are
distinctions of degree.

Each branch has at times crossed

into the area of another, and I suggest the Framers assumed
a certain flexibility in this regard.

But recognition of

the constraints of the principle is required of all branches,
as Jefferson pointed out in his Notes on the State
The line must be drawn.
in Buckley, supra,

The Supreme Court drew that line

but more often the line must be drawn

by forces of institutional self-restraint.
of oversight is not
drawn there also.

of Virginia.

chal1eng~d

The importance

by saying that a line must be

There is a question of how far a committee

can go in monitoring intelligence operations for legitimate
legislative purposes before the tendency develops to attempt
to manage them.

The oversight bill submitted by the Chairman

of the Senate Select Committee last Thursday, S. 2893, would

4

create an intelligence connnittee "to assure that such
activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws
of the United States."

The bill further requires that the

connnittee be kept "fully and currently informed with respect
to intelligence activities," and that no significant covert
or clandestine operation (other than activities solely
for the collection of intelligence) go forward "unless and
until the Connnittee

. . has been fully informed of the

proposed activity."

Members of Congress as well as the

President have a duty to our Constitution, but it is the
President's responsibility under Art. II, Section 3 of the
Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."

I do not question for a moment the need of such

a committee for information sufficient for its legitimate
purposes.

But the line between that information which is

needed for these purposes and the information needed to
assume managerial duties is, in my view, the determinant
of what information can properly be required.

Thus Senator

Fulbright, in connnnenting on a proposed amendment to the Mutual

i

Security Act of 1957 containing a "fully and currently informel

-
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reporting requirement, stated:
Under our systenl of Government the very
fact that we have a legislative and executive
branch necessitates that one branch must, occasionally,
accord to the other branch a certain degree of
trust.
If the amendment of the.Senator from
Wyoming means anything, it means that he is not
satisfied with the way the executive branch is
administering the law, and he wants the legislative
branch to take over that function by requiring
full and current reports, why does the Senator
want that if it is not to assume the responsibility
which is in the Executive? If we are to be fully
informed, then I suppose we should take the
responsibility of administering the law day by
day.
It is a wholly unworkable approach to this
problem.
103 Congo Rec. 9150
The amendment was defeated.

The point is delicate but

fundamental.
Whatever mechanisms are devised for Congressional
intelligence oversight, they must leave to the Executive
such discretion as the Constitution places in his Office and
the ability to act within his sphere without unwarranted
and debilitating restraints.

Some procedures which might

work in other areas will be inappropriate in a field as
volatile and sensitive as foreign intelligence.

The impediments

commonly associated with intermediate bureaucracies
here serve neither the Congress nor the nation.

would

"Energy

in the Executive," wrote Hamilton in Federalist No. 70, "is
a leading character in the definition of good government.
It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady
administration of the laws."

The Executive must retain the

freedom to respond to what Jefferson in the context of the

-
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Louisiana Purchase called the "fugitive occurrence" demanding
prompt and decisive action.

The President too is the

representative of the people, and his Office was designed to
afford a capacity for action and decision.
A specific aspect of Separation of Powers raised by
oversight of agencies charged with gathering foreign intelligen
and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's criminal investiga
functions is the existence of privileged information within
the Executive Branch.

The doctrine of "Executive privilege"

has come through a stormy season, yet in the eye of that storm,
the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional basis of the
privilege and, when properly utilized, its essential public
purpose.

In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),

the Court stated:
The privilege is fundamental to the operation
of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution.

*

*

*

Nowhere in the Constitution
is there any
explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality,
yet to the extent this interest relates to the
effective discharge of a President's powers, it is
constitutionally based.
The Court, while requiring production of material over a claim
of privilege by the Executive in that case, was careful
to emphasize that the information sought was not claimed to
involve military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets.

i'

I
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The Supreme Court quoted from the 1948 opinion of Justice
Jackson in C & S Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 u.S. 103, Ill,
"The President, both as Conunander-in-Chief and as the Nation's
organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services
whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world",
and from Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in 1953 in united States
v. Reynolds, 345 u.S. 1, where the Court said:
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged.
When this is the case, the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize
the security which the privilege is meant to protect by
insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the
judge alone in chambers.
Adrnittedl~

the Court in United States v. Nixon, as it pointed out

in a footnote, was not concerned "with the balance between the
President's generalized interest in confidentiality and the
need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that
between the confidentiality interest and congressional demands
for information, nor with the President's interest in preserving
secrets."

There may be disagreement as to whether the Congressional

claim for information is stronger or less strong than that of
the judiciary in criminal proceedings or of a grand jury.

The

District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Senate Select Conunittee

v. Nixon suggests that the answer depends on particular circumstances.
As you recall, in that case--the only case concerning a claim
of executive privilege as against a congressional conunittee

-
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subpoena--the Court held that the committee's need for the
information was not sufficient to overcome the general need
for executive confidentiality, even though the same court
had earlier held, in Nixon v. Sirica, that the grand jury's
need for the same information was sufficient to defeat the
generalized claim of privilege.
The Senate Select Committee decision, however, rests
clearly on the point that the privilege applies to congressional,
as well as judicial, subpoenas.

As the Supreme Court stated

in United States v. Nixon, the claim of privilege "can be said
to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own
assigned areas of constitutional duties," and pointed out that
the fact that there is no provision in the Constitution for a
presidential privilege as to the President's communications
corresponding to the privilege of Members of Congress was not
dispositive of the issue as to whether there was such a
vilege.

i

t

pri-
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There is one area of confidentiality which I wish
to emphasize as of special importance in the context of
oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I refer

here to the privilege with respect to investigatory files.
Attorney General Jackson stated cogently and succinctly the
justification for withholding certain material in such
files even from the Congress in an official opinion letter
to Chairman Vinson of the House Committee on Naval Affairs.
[DJisclosure of the reports would be of serious
prejudice to the future usefulness of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . [MJuch of
this information is given in confidence and can
only be obtained upon pledge not to disclose its
sources. A disclosure of the sources would
embarrass informants -- sometimes in their employment, sometimes in their social relations, and in
extreme cases might even endanger their lives. We
regard the keeping of faith with confidential
informants as an indispensable condition of future
efficiency.
40 A.G. Op. 45, 46-47.
The tllen Attorney General went on to observe, "Disclosure of
information containeci in the reports might also be the grossest
kind of injustice to innocent individuals.

Investigative

reports include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the
statements of malicious or misinformed people."
The necessity of at times withholding investigatory
files from Congress has been analyzed by Professor Cox as
follows:

- 10

A judicial proceeding is usually adversary.
The plaintiff and defendant may be expected
to call for observance of rather strict rules
of evidence which would exclude most of the
contents of such files as hearsay or otherwise
incompetent long before reaching any question
of privilege.
In legislative hearings the
committees quite properly refuse to confine
themselves to evidence competent in a court.
There are no parties. The Executive must
therefore take it upon itself to protect
individuals against disclosure of untested
allegations and reports.
It is all too clear
that fairness requires some protection for the
individual; it is also beyond argument that the
interests of efficient administration are thereby
served. Men and women will be less willing
to take positions in the government if they know
that they thereby open themselves to publication
of rumors and false allegations.
Informants will
be less likely to come forward with information.
The government may shrink from conducting a
thorough investigation knowing the risk of abuse
of what it gathers.
Few individuals whose files
were publicized in congressional hearings conducted
by a pUblicity-seeking Senator or Representative
would think themselves protected by the rights
to cross-examine and offer opposing testimony.
For such reasons few of the present critics of
executive privilege found fault with Presidents
Roosevelt, Trwnan and Eisenhower for withholding
intelligence or loyalty and security files.
Cox,
Executive Privilege, 122 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1383, 1426-27
(1974).

11

466

Wide. ranging demands by an oversight committee for personal
investigatory matter, and certainly the public disclosure of
such material, would vitiate the purposes of the Privacy Act
and of the Freedom of Information Act's exemption.

The purpose

of the Privacy Act, expressed in section 2(b), was to provide
"safeguards for an individual against the invasion of personal
privacy."

This was accomplished, among other means, byestab-

lishing the strict limitations contained in 5 U.S.C. §552a(b)
on the permissible dissemination, disclosure, and use of information about individuals without their prior consent.

The

same policy is embodied in Exemption 7 to the Freedom of Information Act's compulsory disclosure requirement--5 U.S.C.
§S52(b)(7).

That section, as amended in 1974, exempts inves-

tigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes from
disclosure when disclosure would "constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy."

At the same time, Exemption 7

recognizes that disclosure of investigatory files may seriously
endanger law enforcement interests.

Accordingly, investigatory

files are exempt from compulsory disclosure when disclosure
would, among other things, reveal the identity of a confidential
source or confidential information furnished by a confidential
source, "disclose investigative techniques and procedures,"
or "endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel."
Both the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act
provide specifically that their intent was not to prevent dissemination of information to the Congress.

(5 U.S.C. 552(a)

12
(b) (9)-Privacy Act).

In the past broad demands for this kind

of information by committees have been infrequent.

But if there

were broad demands in the future, the protection announced by
these Acts would become illusory.

Moreover, protection would

not be just dependent upon safekeeping of the material by the
committees.

I fear that routine release of personal informa-

tion from criminal investigatory files would create the potential for and, inevitably. the suspicion and the fear of
misuse of that information.
Executive privilege, constitutionally grounded as it is
as an incident of Executive power, and recognized by the
courts as such, is not in my view subject to legislative
annulment.

Should that privilege be invoked in circumstances

deemed inappropriate by the proposed committee, the possibility
of litigation of the question exists.

I would note, however,

that it is by no means clear that a court will accept jurisdiction over such an issue or that a court would or could
produce any firm or (from the perspective of the Congress)
even desirable guidelines.

See Senate Select Committee on

Presidential" Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
732 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
I would anticipate that invocation of an absolute privilege
against disclosure of information to a congressional intelligence oversight committee would be a rare occurrence.

With

regard to the recently completed investigations, the President
has turned over to the Congress an extraordinary amount of
highly sensitive information in order that the committees might
carry out their mission.

Successful democracies achieve an
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accommodation of competing values.
I believe the point is well made in a recent lecture
by Judge Henry Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.

Judge Friendly, one of our country's

most distinguished jurists, wrote as follows:

"It is no

accident that we should recently have been witnessing a
series of near confrontations over the desires of

congressional

committees to burrow ever more deeply into the files of the
Executive Branch.

I have not made the study needed to arrive

at a judgment just where the lines should be drawn, and it
would be improper for me to express an opinion if I had one.
But it cannot be wrong to suggest that both sides did well
to work out accommodations;

that the courts should not be

called upon too often to umpire contests between the other
branches; that while the Executive should not force Congress
into protracted judicial proceedings in order to obtain
urgently needed information, Congress may be wise sometimes to
settle for less than its maximum demands, since, on the one
hand, not everything in Presidential and departmental files is
truly confidential and, on the other,Congress does not really
require, or at any rate need to divulge, every last nugget of
sensitive information in order to legislate intelligently or
to discharge its duties as the grand inquest of the nation.
Although neither Congress nor the Executive should sacrifice
fundamentals,
Supreme

the spirit of the framers calls for what the

Court has termed a "formula of compromise."

Just as

14

Presidents should recall the wisdom of Washington in giving
the House of Representatives everything it wished about the
failure of the St. Clai.r Expediti.on ~ ,so

l~g:i.sli\tors

should

reflect on what Senator Fessenden said in defending the
legality of a Senate inquiry into John Brown's raid:
I am ready to use judiciously, calmly,
moderately, all the power which I believe
is necessary and inherent, in order to do
that which I am appointed to do .
"
Judge Friendly adds with respect to the last quotation: "The
adverbs are as important as the assertion."

468
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I have raised the subject of executive privilege for one
important reason:

to urge that any system which you establish

leave room for accommodation of the Presidential obligation
to maintain secrecy and the congressional need for information,
through various arrangements which the two branches have in
the past devised, and which have been generally· satisfactory.
I think it would be a mistake for the Congress to disable a committee

from agreeing to accept certain information with the understanding
that it shall not be further disclosed or from adopting some
other means of accommodation.

Such a restriction would eliminate

one of the principal buffers that have cushioned what might
otherwise have been repeatedly harmful collisions between the
two branches in the past.
In suggesting such arrangements, however, I must
emphasize that assurance of tight and enforceable procedures
to maintain the confidentiality of the sensitive information
with which the proposed committee will be largely concerned
will be a prerequisite to a conscientious decision to disclose

by the Executive.
~anticipated
\

The dangers of disclosures of the nature

and their potential impact upon the efficacy of

.

our intelligence apparatus was advanced by Jay in Federalist
No. 64 where he wrote that those who would supply useful
intelligence "WOUld rely on the secrecy of the President" but
'would not confide "in that of the Senate and still less in that
'<'

of a large popular Assembly."

Jay's premise bears articulation

- 16 -

in

the current climate -- not all secrets are intended merely

to save an Administration embarrassment.
Secrecy, despite the unpopular reputation it now
has, is a responsibility of the governors of any State in the
conduct of certain affairs.

Intelligence operations are the

prime example of such affairs, and for that reason the task
of the members of the proposed oversight committee will be,
as the decisions involving foreign intelligence have always
been for the President, extremely difficult and taxing.

The

committee will have to accept the responsibility of legislatively
responding to specific information without the benefit of the
vigorous public debate from which the policy of a free government
ordinarily draws its vitality.
be made by referendum.

Decisions in this area cannot

Intelligence oversight is a quintessential

case in which, in Edmund Burke's phrase, the people must rely
upon the judgment of their representatives as well as their
industry.

Unless we are to depart from the judgment of

statesmen from the beginning of time and forgo intelligence
gathering altogether, we must accept some of the burdens of
its endemic secrecy.
Since secrecy is essential, I would like to address
the mechanisms for its assurance which might be established.
Adequate procedures for confidentiality would, in my view,
form the cornerstone of a cooperative relationship between
the proposed committee and the Executive.

I stress cooperation.

The branches of government were not designed to be at war with
one another.

The relationship was not to be an adversary one,

- 17 -

though to think of it that way has become fashionable.
Inevitably in a system of divided powers there are points where
responsibility conflicts, where legitimate interests and
demands appear on either side.

The essence

of compromise

is that there be no surrender of principle or power on
either side, but a respect for the responsibility of others
and recognition of the need for flexibility and reconciliation
of competing interests.

Institutional self-restraint does

not mean that we must have a government of hesitancy.
It does mean that the duty to act is coupled with a duty to
act with care and comity.
creation of viable procedures by which classified
information will be protected from public disclosure has to
be seen against the background that Congressmen and their
staffs have immunity from judicial process with respect
to their legislative acts--acts that include, under the
Supreme Court's decision in Gravel v. united States,
408 u.S. 606 (1972), the public disclosure of classified
material in the course of congressional debates and hearings.
The immunity from external sanction, absent any viable system
of protection enforced by the Congress itself, inevitably
reinforces the possibility that dangerous disclosures,
however motivated, will occur.

- 18 Whether any or all of this information should
be classified is not the issue.

Rather the issue is whether

anyone Representative, Senator, or staff member, or even
a majority of any committee should have the power, in practic~r
- I

effect, to revoke the classification.

There is, of course,

the additional problem of intended or unintended secret
disclosures which do not invoke the irmnuni ty clause but where
there is no effective sanction or prohibition.

The result

is toat disclosures, for whatever reason, may occur, licit
or ilicit, may halt, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with
the lawful operations of the Government.
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the best resolution to permit five members of any comrnittce!
to have such a power.

As to release by the full Senate, with

all due respect, one has to emphasize the difficulties that
must be met if such a procedure is properly to safeguard
classified information.

Simply put, the danger of public dis-

closure depends, in part, on the number of persons who have
access to information.

Moreover, assuming that the House had

u similar procedure for a similar oversight committee, or if
the committee were joint, one can easily imagine one house
voting to publish and the other not.
There are other alternatives.

Section l12(b) of Title I

of the United States Code, for example,

(the so-called Case

Amendment) provides that the Administration shall transmit to
the Congress international agreements, but the President may

I"

-
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require that an agreement be held in confidence until he
determines that secrecy is no longer essential.

The

Con~ress

retains, of course, the ability to bring its not inconsiaerable political power to bear in favor of lifting the injunction
to secrecy.
A precedent with less assurance of success, but perhaps
workable, would be the procedure agreed upon between the
President and the House Select Conunittee under which the Committe(
could not release information given it if the President

certifi~

in writing that public disclosure would jeopardize national
security.

The Conunittee retained the option, however, of

seeking judicial resolution should a dispute over release arise.
Whatever system is devised for determining whether

disc~

sure should be made, there must be some means to ensure that
the system is not circumvented by disclosures that have not been
approved.

Could there not be a clear statement by the Congress

that members or staff responsible for unauthorized disclosures
be subject to penalty to the extent permitted under the Speech
and Debate Clause?

The bills which I have examined contain no

adequate sanction provision, if such a provision is desired.
There are, I know, severe practical obstacles to congressional enforcement of rules against disclosure.

Perhaps the

only appropriate conunent for me to make is that I believe this
is a most important and difficult problem which has to be
looked at directly, I trust, by this Conunittee.

471
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In short, as you review various proposals for oversight
committees, I would urge that it is in the interest of our
country, and in the mutual interest of both the Congress and
the Executive to create procedures, sanctions, and controls
which adequately assure that classified information provided
the committee will be maintained safe from disclosure.
Congressional involvement in decisions relating to intelligence
activity should not, and I trust, will not mean that there
will be no confidentiality to intelligence practices or that
there will be a

permanent on-going revelation of all practices

for the purpose of public debate.

There is a burden, as I

have said, to the necessity for some secrecy.

Without assur-

ance on that point, the committee will never be able to
play the role which has been envisioned for it.

- 22 -

Finally, I wish to raise with the Committee
the problems which I believe will be present when Congressional
oversight of intelligence activities is chartered so
broadly as to include oversight of important segments of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation which are essentially
of a law enforcement character, and which should be closely
related and tied to law enforcement.

This includes domestic

security as well as counterintelligence responsibilities
of the Bureau.
Unlike agencies such as the CIA, whose mission
is the collection and evaluation of intelligence, the FBI
is essentially a law enforcement agency.

Its principal

responsibility is the detection and investigation of
violations of the Federal criminal laws.

This is the

direction which must be emphasized. It is the direction
Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone emphasized when he
stated:
The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned
with political or other opinions of individuals.
It is concerned only with their conduct and then
only when such conduct is forbidden by the laws
of the United States. When a police system
passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous
to the proper administration of justice and to
human liberty, which it should be our first
concern to cherish.

472'
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As I indicated in my statement before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities last December, it
does not follow from Stone's sound warning, for example,
that domestic security investigations conducted by the
Bureau are outside the Bureau's proper functions.

It does

follow that those investigations should be conducted only
to ascertain information on activities which involve or will
involve the violation of federal law.

The detection of

crime in many areas (and not only the domestic security
area) requires preparation and at least some knowledge
of what activities are taking place.

This is true, for

example, in organized crime investigations, as well as ln
domestic security investigations.

While these responsibilities

of the Bureau may be characterized as intelligence activities,
they are, as they should be, directed toward its criminal
law enforcement function.
The point I have made about domestic intelligence
investigations applies as well to FBI counterintelligence
activities, which have a similar law enforcement nexus
derived from the antiespionage statutes.

While the results

of these activities may on occasion manifest themselves in
forms other than criminal prosecution, the connection with
law enforcement is inseparable.

24
In the foreign intelligence area, the work of the Bureau
is almost invariably related to counterintelligence, and thus
enforcement.

tot,

It is true that some foreign intelligence

activities by the Bureau are conducted, subject to the approval
of the Attorney General, at the request of other intelligence
agencies.

As to these responsibilities, which comprise only

a small part of the FBI's investigative activities, the oversight of the intelligence agencies requesting the cooperation
of the Bureau, necessarily will entail review of the judgments and policies reflected in such agencies' requests for
the assistance of the Burea.

Separate oversight jurisdiction

would not seem to be necessary.
In drawing your attention to this basic difference between the primary investigatory activities of the Bureau
and other agencies' intelligence activities, I do not mean
to suggest that there are no similarities; certainly some
of the methods and techniques utilized are similar.

Nor do

I mean to suggest that there are no differences between
the Bureau's activities in the domestic security or
counterintelligence areas and its activities in the more
traditional criminal law areas; in the former the importance
of timely information and the value of a predictive capability
is often greater than in the latter.

Rather, my point is

that these activities are an integral part of the basic

,
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law enforcement function of the Bureau and that there is
a problem if, for purposes of oversight, they are separated
out and included within oversight of intelligence activities
not law enforcement related.

Put in another way, I think

it is important that these activities be viewed both within
and outside the Bureau in a law enforcement setting, and this
is one reason why any system of oversight should deal with
the Bureau as a unit.
to

There is a further reason for oversight

be directed to the Bureau as a whole.

The various

investigatory functions of the Bureau are inseparably related.
As a result, oversight which is directed at, for example,
intelligence activities to the exclusion of law enforcement
functions would have a disturbing potential for generating
conflicting congressional guidance.

Our experience in developing guidelines governing the
activities

o~

the Bureau may be illustrative.

The Department

of Justice has been engaged for many months in the drafting
of these guidelines.

They are taking a long time to develop,

I am sorry to say, but I know they will be useful not only as
guidelines but as the basis for statutory changes, executive
orders and rules.

This task has impressed upon us the inter-

26 relationship of these activities and of the policies that
should control them.

The very exercise of the guidelines and

much of their value, is to see the Bureau's activities, when
the guidelines are completed, as interrelated and imposing simlJ
standards unless departures in standards are clearly justified.
The effectiveness of congressional review of the guidelines
will be maximized if they are seen as a whole rather than
carved into segments for consideration by various committees,
each with its special concernsand interests.
It should be clear that my objections to including these
activities of the FBI in comprehensive intelligence oversight
are not objections to the congressional review of these aspects
of the Bureau's operation or the Department's supervision of
it.

I welcome and encourage such review whether the oversight

is conducted by the committee designated with that general
responsibility or by a committee reviewing intelligence policies
of which the

activities of the Bureau are an incidental part.

-
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I have attempted to describe what I believe
are some of the critical considerations that must enter
the design of a system of oversight in this sensitive
area, a system that will ensure that Congress can fulfill
its constitutional responsibilities and respond to the vital
interests of the public in protecting the security of the
nation and, at the same time, protecting our citizens'
rights.

I know that, in describing the problems, I have

not gone far in suggesting any very firm answers.

In

part that is because I am not sure I know what the best
answers are.

But in part, too, it is because you are better

judges than I of the kinds of Congressional arrangements
that are best suited to addressing the problems and concerns
I have described.

I would add only that oversight carries

with it, as I am confident you know, a heavy responsibility-a responsibility that is properly yours under our Constitution,
a responsibility that can be exercised, and must be,
"judiciously, calmly, moderately."

As Judge Friendly said,

"The adverbs are as important as the assertion."
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